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		<title>New sanctions-related end-use control in the United Kingdom</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/new-sanctions-related-end-use-control-in-the-united-kingdom/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[therese]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 May 2026 16:27:10 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/?p=1291</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The United Kingdom’s Department for Business Trade (DBT) published, on 22 April, guidance for undertakings on sanctions end-use controls in the field of export control. This guidance does not have binding normative force. It accompanies the adoption of the Sanctions Regulations[1] of 20 April 2026 entering into force on 13 May 2026 (2026 No. 443 [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;">The United Kingdom’s Department for Business Trade (DBT) published, on 22 April, guidance for undertakings on sanctions end-use controls in the field of export control. This guidance does not have binding normative force. It accompanies the adoption of the Sanctions Regulations<a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><sup>[1]</sup></a> of 20 April 2026 entering into force on 13 May 2026 (2026 No. 443 The Sanctions (EU Exit) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2026).</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The purpose of sanctions end-use controls of goods is to combat the circumvention of trade sanctions. Circumvention risks are deemed high for exporters shipping to third countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Turkey, and Kyrgyzstan.</p>
<p><strong><u>1.Sanctions-related end-use control (SEUC: “Sanctions End-Use Controls”)</u></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The new control implemented by the British authorities henceforth requires a licence for exports to non?sanctioned third countries where the government has informed the exporter of the risk of circumvention of sanctions.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Prior to the entry into force of this mechanism, HMRC (His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs)  and the Department for Business and Trade confined themselves, where applicable, to informing the exporter of the identified risks, without being able to impose any obligation. It was for the exporter, at its sole discretion, to decide whether or not to proceed with the export.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Now, the requirement for a new licence enables the British government to assess the potential risk and, where necessary, to prevent exports where the risk of sanctions circumvention is deemed to be high.</p>
<p><strong><u>2.The goods concerned</u></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Controls are based on the current prohibitions on making restricted goods and technologies available to a sanctioned destination.<a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> These prohibitions are expressly set out in the sanctions lists<a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> published by the United Kingdom and in “The Export Control Order 2008” and the “Export Control Act 2002<a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a>”.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The end-use control applies extensively, beyond arms embargoes (for which the military end-use control already applies). The control applies to goods and related technologies that are sanctioned under the sanctions regimes applicable to: the Republic of Belarus, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Iran, Libya, Myanmar, Russia and the territories of Ukraine not controlled by the government of Ukraine, Somalia, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.</p>
<p><strong><u>3.Who is required to submit an application for an SEUC licence?</u></strong></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Phase 1, (i) the government “informs” the exporter that their flows present a risk of being diverted to a sanctioned person. This information shall be issued by the National Clearance Centre (HMRC) or by contacting OTSI (<em>Office of Trade Sanctions Implementation</em>)<a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5"><sup>[5]</sup></a>. Anticipated SEUC licence applications shall not be received by OTSI; the exporter shall be required to await notification from the government.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Phase 2, (ii) the exporter must submit an application for a SEUC licence on OTSI’s online platform<a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6"><sup>[6]</sup></a>. The OTSI guidance has been updated for this purpose<a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7"><sup>[7]</sup></a>.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Since 27 April, the OTSI has been responsible for issuing export licences for sanctioned goods (and associated ancillary services) intended for export to sanctioned destinations, via the SPIRE system of the <em>Department for Business and Trade.</em><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8"><sup>[8]</sup></a> Conversely, the <em>Export Control Joint Unit </em>(ECJU) retains jurisdiction to issue licences for dual?use or military goods, software and technology that are controlled abroad (Open General Export Licences “OGELs”).</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Phase 3, (iii) the OTSI shall grant or refuse the SEUC licence, thereby preventing export to the identified end?user or along the identified route. The assessment of licence applications by OTSI generally requires a minimum of 6 months. No specific time limit has been provided to date in respect of SEUC licences. Export licences are issued by e?mail.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In the event of a breach of the prohibition arising from the licence refusal, the exporter is, in particular, exposed to monetary penalties, to the refusal or revocation of existing and future export licences, and to being identified as an entity infringing sanctions.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2026/443/made/data.pdf">https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2026/443/made/data.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> See <em>for example</em>, the prohibition on exports to Iran of tropospheric scatter communication equipment using analogue or digital modulation techniques and components specially designed therefor (<em>PL9005, Export Control Order 2008: </em><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3231/data.pdf"><em>https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2008/3231/data.pdf</em></a>)</p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-uk-sanctions-list</a>  <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/trade-sanctions-arms-embargoes-and-other-trade-restrictions">https://www.gov.uk/guidance/trade-sanctions-arms-embargoes-and-other-trade-restrictions</a></p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> <a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/28/data.pdf">https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/28/data.pdf</a></p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-trade-sanctions-implementation/about">https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/office-of-trade-sanctions-implementation/about</a></p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> <a href="https://signin.account.gov.uk/sign-in-or-create">https://signin.account.gov.uk/sign-in-or-create</a></p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> <a href="https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-a-licence-to-carry-out-sanctioned-trade-through-otsi">https://www.gov.uk/guidance/apply-for-a-licence-to-carry-out-sanctioned-trade-through-otsi</a></p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://78CA7FD3-C00D-4876-A355-D3EF521C35C8#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> <a href="https://otsi.blog.gov.uk/2026/04/09/expanding-otsis-licensing-remit/">https://otsi.blog.gov.uk/2026/04/09/expanding-otsis-licensing-remit/</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="applewebdata://FEFAC5C6-F891-4F87-B538-B4951091C79D#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1"></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">SOURCES:</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Guidance published on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 2026 by the Dept of Business &amp; Trade / Office of Trade / sanctions implementation : <em><u>Sanctions end-use controls : guidance for businesses</u></em><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sanctions-end-use-controls-guidance-for-businesses">https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sanctions-end-use-controls-guidance-for-businesses</a></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The Sanctions (“EU Exit”) (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2026 &#8211;&gt; coming into force 13<sup>th</sup> May 2026</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><a href="https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2026/443/made/data.pdf">https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2026/443/made/data.pdf</a></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">
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		<title>Export Control &#038; International Sanctions: Record fine in Guernsey for ITI Trade Ltd</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/export-control-international-sanctions-record-fine-in-guernsey-for-iti-trade-ltd/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[therese]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2025 10:38:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/?p=1250</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On July 18, 2025, the Guernsey Financial Services Commission (GFSC) imposed a cumulative penalty of £210,000 on ITI Trade Ltd and its director, Alex Phil (formerly Alexei Filatov). This fine marks a turning point in the supervision of sanctions regime obligations and serves as a stark reminder of the risks associated with uncontrolled outsourcing to [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;">On July 18, 2025, the Guernsey Financial Services Commission (GFSC) imposed a cumulative penalty of £210,000 on ITI Trade Ltd and its director, Alex Phil (formerly Alexei Filatov). This fine marks a turning point in the supervision of sanctions regime obligations and serves as a stark reminder of the risks associated with uncontrolled outsourcing to high-risk jurisdictions.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Behind the facade of a Guernsey -registered investment company, ITI Trade operated primarily as a conduit for activities conducted from Russia- a practice made even more problematic by the fact that sanctions against the Russian Federation have been significantly tightened since the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The GFSC highlighted a surge in flows and assets under management (+440% in the first half of 2022), against a backdrop of tougher international sanctions regimes. However, this rapid expansion of operations did not prompt an appropriate response from ITI Trade&#8217;s management, who maintained a largely fictitious compliance structure.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">As a result, the company ceased operations and administrators were appointed by the Royal Court. The GFSC emphasized the seriousness of the breaches, particularly given the high-risk profile of the clientele and the lack of effective controls to manage these risks.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u>Major compliance and sanctions breaches</u></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The Commission&#8217;s investigation revealed a series of systemic failures, particularly regarding Export Control &amp; Sanctions obligations:</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">No reliable screening mechanism, particularly for Russian nationals or politically exposed persons (PEPs);</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Outsourcing of customer and financial flow controls to a Russian sister company, under conditions deemed “rudimentary” and without effective supervision;</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Lack of country/customer risk mapping, preventing a coherent view of exposures;</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Failure to identify beneficial owners for more than 75% of assets under management (108 unidentified individuals).</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Worse still, the director personally altered a compliance report intended for the regulator, attempting to conceal the extent of internal deficiencies.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u>The fundamental principle: <strong>responsibility cannot be delegated</strong></u></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">This case clearly illustrates a cardinal principle of sanctions law and export control:</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Regulatory responsibility can never be fully transferred.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">When certain functions -such as screening, KYC, or customer management- are outsourced, the company remains solely responsible for the compliance of the entire system in the eyes of the supervisory authorities. This applies to financial companies as well as industrial companies.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u>A strong signal to players in the trade and finance sectors</u></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">This record fine (even if its amount seems relatively symbolic in view of the offenses charged and the volumes referred to) is a clear warning to financial institutions, brokerage firms, and exporters:</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">It is not enough to have a license in a reputable jurisdiction to comply.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">It is necessary to demonstrate real, local, proactive mastery of the obligations relating to the Authority for Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism (AMLA/LCB-FT) and sanctions.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">International sanctions regimes (UK, EU, US) now impose high standards that brook no leniency, even within complex structures or those spread across several countries.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u>Key points: best practices to adopt</u></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">To avoid the pitfalls of the ITI Trade case, here are some essential best practices to implement:</p>
<ul>
<li>Rigorous auditing of service providers and related entities, particularly in high-risk jurisdictions;</li>
<li>Independent, verifiable, and documented screening of clients and partners, particularly those exposed to sanctions or blacklists;</li>
<li>Active supervision of outsourced functions, with contracts setting out responsibilities and alert mechanisms;</li>
<li>Up-to-date risk mapping, incorporating geopolitical and regulatory developments;</li>
<li>Total transparency with the authorities: concealing a breach aggravates the penalty, including for executives personally.</li>
</ul>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The ITI Trade case reveals a common pitfall in cross-border models: confusing license with legitimacy, and formal compliance with substantive compliance.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">It also shows that regulators will no longer tolerate opaque arrangements, unclear responsibilities, or superficial controls.</p>
<p><span style="font-weight: 400;">In a world where sanctions are becoming a major tool of international policy, any company operating internationally must, to succeed, make compliance a strategic priority, on a par with its commercial performance.</span></p>
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		<title>United States &#8211; New law to enhance transparency in export controls</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/united-states-new-law-to-enhance-transparency-in-export-controls/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[therese]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 21 Aug 2025 10:36:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/?p=1246</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On July 22, 2025, the US Senate unanimously passed HR 1316, entitled “Ensuring American Global Superiority by Enhancing Export Controls Transparency Act.” This bill, now awaiting presidential signature, aims at strengthening oversight of the US export control regime, particularly regarding certain strategic countries such as China. This new law amends the Export Control Reform Act [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p style="font-weight: 400;">On July 22, 2025, the US Senate unanimously passed HR 1316, entitled “Ensuring American Global Superiority by Enhancing Export Controls Transparency Act.” This bill, now awaiting presidential signature, aims at strengthening oversight of the US export control regime, particularly regarding certain strategic countries such as China.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">This new law amends the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) of 2018 by imposing an annual reporting requirement to Congress for any application for a license or authorization for export, re-export, or domestic transfer involving:</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Entities located in countries subject to arms embargoes (Group D:5 of the EAR and §126 of the ITAR, including China);</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Parties listed on the Military End User List (MEU) or the BIS Entity List.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The Department of Commerce, through the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), will therefore be required to disclose in a non-public annual report the details of each application processed:</p>
<ul>
<li>Name of the applicant company;</li>
<li>Description of the goods and their classification (ECCN);</li>
<li>Name and location of the end user;</li>
<li>Value of the goods;</li>
<li>Decision rendered and date of submission.</li>
</ul>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The BIS report will also detail end-use checks and aggregate statistics on all authorizations processed.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u>A challenge for technological sovereignty</u></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Adopted in a context of strategic rivalry with China, this law marks a clear desire to rebalance the scales between commercial interests and national security imperatives. A parliamentary inquiry conducted in 2023 criticized the BIS for being too permissive in its approvals of transfers of sensitive technologies to China, highlighting the lack of sufficient traceability.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">The text therefore aims at establishing a systematic “paper trail” enabling Congress and federal agencies to better monitor the flow of critical dual-use technologies, particularly in the fields of semiconductors, AI, and telecommunications.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u>What impacts can be expected?</u></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">Even though the report will not be made public (except for statistical data), it imposes an obligation of increased transparency on US manufacturers and their partners. This reform could also inspire similar initiatives in Europe, where the issue of sensitive export governance is also under debate, particularly in the context of the strengthening of Regulation (EU) 2021/821 on international trade of Dual -Use goods.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;">In the meantime, exporting companies operating with entities located in countries under control or on sensitive lists should be extra vigilant, as the BIS could tighten its review criteria in the coming months.</p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u>Next steps: </u>If the President signs this bill into law as expected, the BIS&#8217;s first report will have to be submitted to Congress by July 2026. This sends a strong signal toward stricter and more transparent regulation of trade in technologies of high strategic value.</p>
<p><u style="font-weight: 400;"> </u></p>
<p style="font-weight: 400;"><u> </u></p>
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		<title>Correlation table codes CN / dual use goods updated</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/correlation-table-codes-cn-dual-use-goods-updated/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[lucie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Jan 2024 09:43:17 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Customs Engineering & Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/?p=1002</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The EU correlation table between customs codes (Combined Nomenclature) and “dual-use goods” codes has been updated as of 2 January 2024. This table is only indicative and does not exempt operators from carrying out a classification analysis of their products in accordance with the applicable regulations. It is available on the Europa CIRCABC website.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://xrm.eudonet.com/XRM/ut?tok=EDB4B57B&amp;cs=CkWXwEKWPTP33czgWSUILeMoVkWWshgTjvbUeYwYN7s%3d&amp;p=A3J54cHtKBAWuB0v1OsaZb2j6vjRkIjl_oz9mVvxSU4gxyDlJ0jDHQzXskeZvKwbz8rSTtlTZOasqMQogZg31Om8rsIxvvl8XrPlZIhf80qKh4Rfow1HkOe_KFDf4deiI0xzA_thOr0U9qZ8GVfnp4mnoBXMJ4UjHyb0X9gE5X0m3Dte6pfyaOLoXqkuPpn9zrdk0CqUEfPLY7OP7NaEOGJTtlfRElWZ7QKcmSIolPduPTWpGyQd2SzLthfuiEam4HfLaxuD_ovkttEnQQ6DjsbcwkOF232DKe6cIgh8iqOVRgQZFFBItg%3d%3d">The EU correlation table</a> between customs codes (Combined Nomenclature) and “dual-use goods” codes has been updated as of 2 January 2024.</p>
<p>This table is only indicative and does not exempt operators from carrying out a classification analysis of their products in accordance with the applicable regulations.</p>
<p>It is available on the Europa <a href="https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/0e5f18c2-4b2f-42e9-aed4-dfe50ae1263b/library/1d07bee0-2335-414b-b3d7-70f97526222f/details">CIRCABC website.</a></p>
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		<title>The European Union’s blocking statute against extraterritorial legislation: an effective instrument for protecting the EU&#8217;s economic interests?</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/the-european-unions-blocking-statute-against-extraterritorial-legislation-an-effective-instrument-for-protecting-the-eus-economic-interests/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[lucie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Jul 2023 08:41:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/?p=962</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom[1], was adopted on November 22, 1996. &#160; Its aim is to protect European Union nationals as well as “any legal person”[2] within the [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A31996R2271">Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96</a> of 22 November 1996 <em>protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1"><strong>[1]</strong></a>,</em> was adopted on November 22, 1996.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Its aim is to protect European Union nationals as well as “<em>any legal person”<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2"><strong>[2]</strong></a> </em>within the Union against the effects of an administrative, judicial, or arbitral decision based on an extraterritorial sanction’s regulation<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a>. The extraterritorial application of a rule can be defined as &#8220;<em>the situation in which the State that originated the rule purports to apply it to a person &#8211; individual or company &#8211; of foreign nationality in order to punish acts committed outside the territory of that State</em>”<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The list of laws, regulations and other legislative instruments with extraterritorial application is annexed to the regulation<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a>. These are essentially US economic sanctions against Iran, Cuba, and Syria. If “<em>economic and/or financial interests</em>” of the legal person are directly or indirectly affected by the extraterritorial provisions or by administrative, judicial, or arbitral decisions based thereon, it is obligatory to notify the European Commission within 30 days of the date on which the natural or legal person<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a> obtained the information<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a>. In addition, the persons affected must not comply with the “<em>requirement or prohibition</em>” including judicial sanctions, based on these regulations<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a>. The Commission may, however, issue an authorization to comply if non-compliance “<em>would seriously damage their interests or those of the Community</em>”. Ultimately, it is up to the Member States to determine the penalties for breaches of the Regulation, which must be &#8220;<em>effective, proportionate and dissuasive</em>&#8220;<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In theory, the European Union’s blocking statute makes it possible to protect European companies against laws with extraterritorial reach. However, it appears that its scope and use have not achieved the objective initially set, namely, to neutralize the effects of foreign legislation (<strong>I</strong>). Therefore, the European Union has reached an inflection point where it is now necessarily adapting its legislative arsenal to an increasingly hostile environment (<strong>II</strong>).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>The ineffectiveness of the European Union’s blocking statute </strong></li>
</ol>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>In practice, the scope of Regulation No 2271/96 is neutralized by the possibility given to European operators to request authorization from the European Commission to comply with foreign sanctions<a href="#_ftn10" name="_ftnref10">[10]</a>. This option was introduced in 2018 in response to the reintroduction of US sanctions against Iran. The European Commission feared that European companies would comply unilaterally and abandon trade with Tehran. It was against this backdrop that the Regulation reappeared<a href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11">[11]</a>. The litigation arose because it was impossible for European companies to choose between complying with US sanctions and complying with the European Union’s blocking statute<a href="#_ftn12" name="_ftnref12">[12]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In a Grand Chamber judgment of 21st December 2021<a href="#_ftn13" name="_ftnref13">[13]</a>, the CJEU interpreted Article 5 of Regulation No 2271/96. The case concerned an Iranian state bank (BMI) with a branch in Germany. It had entered several service contracts with Telekom, a German telecommunications company. In 2018, Telekom terminated all its contracts with BMI, following the US withdrawal from the Vienna Agreement on the Iranian nuclear programme<a href="#_ftn14" name="_ftnref14">[14]</a> and the reinstatement of sanctions against Iran. BMI was on OFAC&#8217;s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN). BMI appealed to the Hamburg Regional Court to force Telekom to continue providing the service. This action was dismissed, and the termination was held to comply with Article 5 of Regulation (EC) 2271/96. The referring court decided to stay the proceedings and referred four questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The questions were:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Did Article 5 apply in the absence of any instruction from a foreign authority?</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>If so, could the European operators referred to in Article 11 terminate their contracts without giving reasons?</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>In the event of abusive termination, was the termination ineffective or subject to a fine?</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>If the termination was ineffective, could the operators request a waiver justified by the economic losses in the United States linked to the continuation of the contract<a href="#_ftn15" name="_ftnref15">[15]</a>?</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The judgment concluded that:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Article 5 of the Regulation must be interpreted as meaning that it prohibits European operators from complying with requirements based on the sanctioning regulations, “<strong><em>even in the absence of an order directing compliance issued by the administrative or judicial authorities of the third countries which adopted those laws”<a href="#_ftn16" name="_ftnref16">[16]</a>.</em></strong></li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>More specifically, European operators do not need either authorization to comply with the sanction regulations (provided for in Article 5), or a statement of reasons, to terminate contracts concluded with persons or entities listed on the SDN. However, it will be up to the European entity during proceedings and in the event of suspicion “<strong><em>to establish to the requisite legal standard that his or her conduct was not intended to comply with those laws</em></strong>”<a href="#_ftn17" name="_ftnref17">[17]</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Finally, <u>the cancellation of contracts</u> by a European operator to comply with the sanction’s regulations must be <u>proportionate</u>. In particular, the objective of protecting the legal order and the interests of the EU must be balanced against the risks of economic loss for the operator associated with maintaining contractual relations with the person subject to the sanction.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>European legal precedents have subsequently confirmed that Regulation (EC) 2271/96 no longer appears to be an effective instrument for blocking laws with extraterritorial reach. On the contrary, European operators are encouraged to comply with US sanctions<a href="#_ftn18" name="_ftnref18">[18]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In a judgment of 12 July 2023, the General Court of the European Union upheld the Commission&#8217;s decisions to authorize Clearstream Banking AG to comply with US sanctions against Iran<a href="#_ftn19" name="_ftnref19">[19]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In this case, IFIC Holding AG, a German company indirectly owned by the Iranian state, had not received dividends in respect of its holdings in various German companies. Clearstream Banking AG had suspended the payments and blocked the funds, following IFIC&#8217;s listing on the SDN in 2018. Since 2020, the European Commission has authorized the bank to comply with US sanctions<a href="#_ftn20" name="_ftnref20">[20]</a>. IFIC then applied to have the Commission&#8217;s decisions authorizing it to comply with the sanctions annulled. The General Court dismissed IFIC&#8217;s action and held:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>That the Commission&#8217;s authorization decisions do not have retroactive effect<a href="#_ftn21" name="_ftnref21">[21]</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>That the Commission did not commit an error of assessment by failing to take account of the applicant&#8217;s interests or by not examining whether less restrictive alternatives existed<a href="#_ftn22" name="_ftnref22">[22]</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>That the limitation, for the applicant, of its right to be heard by the Commission in the context of the adoption of those decisions was necessary and proportionate, having regard to the objectives pursued by Regulation 2271/96<a href="#_ftn23" name="_ftnref23">[23]</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In fact, the use of the European regulation by European companies contradicts its ratio legis. They are complying massively with the US sanctions and using the regulation to legitimize breaches of contract with Iranian entities. Rather than forcing European operators not to comply with the sanctions, the CJEU is encouraging companies not to take any risks and to comply with US regulations. This highlights the obsolescence of the legislative framework established by the Commission in 1996. This has revealed the necessity to strengthen the protection of the Union&#8217;s interests against foreign economic offensives.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ol>
<li><strong>The urgent need to strengthen the European Union&#8217;s economic interests</strong></li>
</ol>
<p><strong> </strong></p>
<p>Insofar as the European Union’s blocking statute regulation remains ineffective, other instruments for protecting the Union&#8217;s economic interests should be used.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Since 2021, the European institutions have been considering how to respond to economic coercion measures adopted by third countries<a href="#_ftn24" name="_ftnref24">[24]</a>. In a geopolitical context marked by the return of strategic competition<a href="#_ftn25" name="_ftnref25">[25]</a>, the Commission presented the first European economic security strategy on Tuesday 20 June 2023. The strategy identifies economic dependence and the use of restrictive trade measures by third countries as major risks for the continent<a href="#_ftn26" name="_ftnref26">[26]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>To counter economic coercion, the Council and the Commission have agreed to propose a legal framework for the Member States<a href="#_ftn27" name="_ftnref27">[27]</a>. If “<em>a third country seeks, through measures affecting trade or investment, to coerce the Union or a Member State into adopting or refraining from adopting a particular act</em>”<a href="#_ftn28" name="_ftnref28">[28]</a>, the EU and the Member States would now be able to adopt countermeasures until trade is restored. The new anti-coercion regulation would strengthen the Union&#8217;s legislative arsenal through a multi-stage procedure<a href="#_ftn29" name="_ftnref29">[29]</a>:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Examination by the European Commission to determine whether a third country has engaged in economic coercion<a href="#_ftn30" name="_ftnref30">[30]</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>The Commission&#8217;s proposal to the Council for an implementing measure establishing the existence of a situation of economic coercion regarding the third country concerned, requesting that it be ended, and that compensation be paid for the damage suffered<a href="#_ftn31" name="_ftnref31">[31]</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>If the Council takes this decision, the Commission must then enter dialogue with the third country<a href="#_ftn32" name="_ftnref32">[32]</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>As a last resort, the Commission may adopt the economic measures listed in Annex I to the Regulation<a href="#_ftn33" name="_ftnref33">[33]</a>.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>These include:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>increased customs duties</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>import or export licenses,</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>restrictions on services or public procurement.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>It is interesting to note that this draft regulation is part of the same dialogue process as the 11th package of sanctions against Russia, adopted on 23 June<a href="#_ftn34" name="_ftnref34">[34]</a>. To prevent third countries from circumventing the sanctions, the Commission can now target countries that it suspects of re-exporting goods from the EU to Russia<a href="#_ftn35" name="_ftnref35">[35]</a>. However, such a measure may only be submitted as a last resort, after all diplomatic options have been considered<a href="#_ftn36" name="_ftnref36">[36]</a>. The same applies to Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 on the award of public contracts to third-country operators<a href="#_ftn37" name="_ftnref37">[37]</a>. The restrictive measures applied by third countries in awarding public contracts prompted the EU to forge a reciprocity mechanism. This gives the Commission the power to investigate and even penalize obstacles deemed to be &#8220;<em>serious and recurrent</em>&#8220;<a href="#_ftn38" name="_ftnref38">[38]</a>. However, coercive measures can only be considered after consultation with the third country<a href="#_ftn39" name="_ftnref39">[39]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Ultimately, European, and national economic legislation is adapting to a fragmented international context<a href="#_ftn40" name="_ftnref40">[40]</a>. Indeed, the law is frequently used by states as an instrument of foreign policy<a href="#_ftn41" name="_ftnref41">[41]</a>, enabling them to obtain economic gains (economic lawfare)<a href="#_ftn42" name="_ftnref42">[42]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Finally, it is interesting to note that last year France has updated its own blocking statute<a href="#_ftn43" name="_ftnref43">[43]</a>, prohibiting French companies, on pain of penalty, from communicating sensitive data intended to be used in proceedings instigated by foreign authorities based on extraterritorial regulations<a href="#_ftn44" name="_ftnref44">[44]</a>. While the 1996 European Union’s blocking statute places the burden of complying or not with foreign injunctions on operators, recent regulations create measures that target third countries. This targeting is unprecedented, given the EU&#8217;s declared desire to pacify trade relations with its partners<a href="#_ftn45" name="_ftnref45">[45]</a>. Faced with an upsurge in economic coercion from third countries, the EU has been obliged to now protect its interests and assert itself as a standard-setting power<a href="#_ftn46" name="_ftnref46">[46]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A31996R2271">Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96</a> of 22 November 1996 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom: OJEU L 309, of the 29th of November 1996, p. 1.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01996R2271-20180807">Article 11, 2) </a><em>ibid</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01996R2271-20180807">Article 1</a> <em>ibid</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> L. COHEN-TANUGI, « L’extraterritorialité, nouvel horizon du droit », <em>Commentaire</em>, vol. 182, n°2, 2023, pp. 375-379.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> National Defense Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 1993; Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996; Iran Sanctions Act of 1996; Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act of 2012; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012; Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012; Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> Directors, managers, and other persons with management responsibilities.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> Article 2 Regulation No 2271/96</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> Article 5 <em>ibid</em></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> Article 9 <em>ibid</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref10" name="_ftn10">[10]</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32018R1101">Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/1101 of 3 August 2018</a> laying down the criteria for the application of the second paragraph of Article 5 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96 protecting against the effects of the extra-territorial application of legislation adopted by a third country, and actions based thereon or resulting therefrom.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref11" name="_ftn11">[11]</a> J-S. BAZILLE. « Une première (et dernière ?) interprétation du règlement de blocage européen », <em>Journal du Droit International</em> (<em>Clunet</em>) n° 3, Juillet 2022, comm. 17.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref12" name="_ftn12">[12]</a> T. CHANZY et T. GUILLEMIN. « Sur les programmes américains de sanctions et la réglementation européenne de blocage : les entreprises françaises prises entre deux feux. Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, 21 décembre 2021, n° C-124/20, Bank Melli Iran c/ Telekom Deutschland GmbH », Revue critique de droit international privé, vol. 2, no. 2, 2022, pp. 435-439.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref13" name="_ftn13">[13]</a> <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&amp;docid=251507&amp;pageIndex=0&amp;doclang=EN&amp;mode=req&amp;dir=&amp;occ=first&amp;part=1&amp;cid=525877">CJEU, grand chamber, Dec. 21, 2021, case C-124/20, Bank Melli Iran, Aktiengesellschaft nach iranischem Recht v. Telekom Deutschland GmbH</a>: JurisData n° 2021-021333</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref14" name="_ftn14">[14]</a> <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf"><em>Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action</em></a> (JCPoA), 14 July 2015</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref15" name="_ftn15">[15]</a> M.EECKHOUDT, « Le règlement de blocage : un tigre de papier ? », <em>RTD eur</em>, 2022, 679.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref16" name="_ftn16">[16]</a> §51 CJEU, grand chamber, Dec. 21, 2021, case C-124/20</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref17" name="_ftn17">[17]</a> §68 <em>ibid</em></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref18" name="_ftn18">[18]</a> CJEU, <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2023-07/cp230119en.pdf">Press release No 119/23</a>, Luxembourg, 12 July 2023</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref19" name="_ftn19">[19]</a> <a href="https://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&amp;docid=275363&amp;pageIndex=0&amp;doclang=FR&amp;mode=lst&amp;dir=&amp;occ=first&amp;part=1&amp;cid=3504627">General Court, July. 12., 2023, Case T-8/21, IFIC Holding v Commission</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref20" name="_ftn20">[20]</a> By three decisions of the European Commission authorizing the bank to comply with the US sanctions, in accordance with <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:01996R2271-20180807">paragraph 2 of Article 5 of Regulation No 2271/96</a>: Implementing Decisions C(2020) 2813 of 28 April 2020, C(2021) 3021 of 27 April 2021, C(2022) 2775 of 26 April 2022.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref21" name="_ftn21">[21]</a> § 127 General Court, July. 12., 2023, Case T-8/21</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref22" name="_ftn22">[22]</a> § 80 <em>Ibid</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref23" name="_ftn23">[23]</a> § 120 <em>Ibid</em></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref24" name="_ftn24">[24]</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32021C0212(01)&amp;from=EN">Joint Declaration of the Commission, the Council, and the European Parliament on an instrument to deter and counteract coercive actions by third countries,</a> 12 February 2021, OJEU C 49, p. 1.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref25" name="_ftn25">[25]</a> General Secretariat for Defence and National Security (SGDSN), <a href="https://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/files/files/rns-uk-20221202.pdf">National Strategic Review 2022 55p.</a> This document provides an overview of the international risks facing France, and sets out a strategy, approved by the President of the French Republic, defining the ambitions for dealing with them.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref26" name="_ftn26">[26]</a> European Commission, <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=i&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=0CAIQw7AJahcKEwiYmaus_5WAAxUAAAAAHQAAAAAQAw&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fec.europa.eu%2Fcommission%2Fpresscorner%2Fapi%2Ffiles%2Fattachment%2F875428%2FFactsheet%2520Economic%2520Security%2520Strategy_EN.pdf.pdf&amp;psig=AOvVaw3ekALfk2kRWErfGedXDum0&amp;ust=1689691998025526&amp;opi=89978449"><em>European Economic Security Strategy</em>, <em>Adressing weaponization of economic dependencies and economic coercion</em></a>, 2023, p.8.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref27" name="_ftn27">[27]</a> European Council, “Trade: political agreement on the anti-coercion instrument”, Press release, 28 March 2023 (<a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/03/28/trade-political-agreement-on-the-anti-coercion-instrument/">online</a>)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref28" name="_ftn28">[28]</a> European Union Council, « <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0775">Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of the Union and its Member States from economic coercion by third countries </a>», article 1, 1.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref29" name="_ftn29">[29]</a> Herbert Smith Freehills, “The EU Anti Economic Coercion Regulation – A New Addition to the EU’s Toolbox”, 14 July 2023 (<a href="https://hsfnotes.com/crt/2023/07/14/the-eu-anti-economic-coercion-regulation-a-new-addition-to-the-eus-toolbox/">Online</a>)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref30" name="_ftn30">[30]</a> Article 3, Proposal for a Regulation</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref31" name="_ftn31">[31]</a> Article 4 <em>ibid</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref32" name="_ftn32">[32]</a> Article 5 <em>ibid</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref33" name="_ftn33">[33]</a> Article 7 <em>ibid</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref34" name="_ftn34">[34]</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1214/deu">Council Regulation (EU) 2023/1214 of 23 June 2023</a> amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilizing the situation in Ukraine.</p>
<p><em> </em></p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref35" name="_ftn35">[35]</a> Article 12f <em>§ 3, </em>Council Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia&#8217;s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine: OJEU No L.229, 31 July 2014, p.1 : “<em>Annex XXXIII shall only include third countries that have been identified by the Council as having systematically and persistently failed to prevent the sale, supply, transfer or export to Russia of goods and technology, as listed in that Annex, exported from the Union, <u>despite the Union’s prior outreach and assistance to the country in question”</u></em>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref36" name="_ftn36">[36]</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2023/1214/deu">Regulation (EU) 2023/1214</a>, 8): “<em>In order to address the circumvention of the Union’s restrictive measures through third country jurisdictions, the Union should rapidly strengthen bilateral and multilateral cooperation through diplomatic engagement with, and the provision of increased technical assistance to, the third countries in question.</em>”</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref37" name="_ftn37">[37]</a> <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R1031&amp;qid=1690532597060">Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1031 of 23 June 2023</a> on the access of third-country economic operators, goods and services to the Union’s public procurement and concession markets and procedures supporting negotiations on access of Union economic operators, goods and services to the public procurement and concession markets of third countries (International Procurement Instrument – IPI): OJEU, No L 173, 30 June 2022, § 8</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref38" name="_ftn38">[38]</a> Article 5, Regulation No 2022/1031</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref39" name="_ftn39">[39]</a> Article 5 § 2 <em>Ibid</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref40" name="_ftn40">[40]</a> T. CHOPIN, C. LEQUESNE. « L’Union européenne dans un continent en guerre », Politique étrangère, vol., no. 3, 2022, pp. 75-87</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref41" name="_ftn41">[41]</a> M. CORCORAL. « Le droit comme outil diplomatique : le cas de l&#8217;offensive américaine contre Huawei », Raisons politiques, vol. 85, no. 1, 2022, pp. 101-116.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref42" name="_ftn42">[42]</a> Ali Laïdi, <em>Le droit, nouvelle arme de guerre économique : Comment les États-Unis déstabilisent les entreprises européennes</em>, Paris, Actes Sud, 2019.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref43" name="_ftn43">[43]</a> <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/loda/id/JORFTEXT000000501326">Loi n° 68-678 du 26 juillet 1968</a> relative à la communication de documents et renseignements d&#8217;ordre économique, commercial, industriel, financier ou technique à des personnes physiques ou morales étrangères, complétée par le <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000045190519">Décret n°2022-207 du 18 février 2022</a> et <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000045358485">l’Arrêté du 07 mars 2022</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref44" name="_ftn44">[44]</a> CUSTAX &amp; LEGAL, « The French 1968 Blocking Act: a shield against foreign interference and extraterritorial legislation », 8 June 2023 (<a href="https://www.custax.com/en/rejuvenating-bath-for-the-french-1968-blocking-act-combating-foreign-interference-in-economic-affairs/">Online</a>)</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref45" name="_ftn45">[45]</a> S. MORTIER. « L’Union européenne, un pacificateur dans la guerre économique ? », <em>Hermès La Revue</em>, vol. 90, no. 2, 2022, pp. 139-142.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref46" name="_ftn46">[46]</a> L. COHEN-TANUGI. « L’Europe comme puissance normative internationale : état des lieux et perspectives », <em>RED</em>, vol. 3, no. 2, 2021, pp. 100-106.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Sanctions against Russia &#8211; Circumventing the sanctions</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/sanctions-contre-la-russie-le-contournement-des-sanctions/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[lucie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 26 May 2023 09:54:24 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Customs Engineering & Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/?p=935</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[G7 leaders met in Hiroshima last Friday 19 May to coordinate on new sanctions against Russia[1]. The heads of state and government placed particular emphasis on anti-circumvention measures for sanctions already in place. Indeed, the level of economic restrictions against Moscow seems to have reached a ceiling, making it necessary to address the main loophole [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>G7 leaders met in Hiroshima last Friday 19 May to coordinate on new sanctions against Russia<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a>. The heads of state and government placed particular emphasis on anti-circumvention measures for sanctions already in place. Indeed, the level of economic restrictions against Moscow seems to have reached a ceiling, making it necessary to address the main loophole in the system: the use of third countries and entities to circumvent Western sanctions.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>National measures to combat sanctions circumvention</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The United States<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a> and the United Kingdom<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a> have followed suit by publishing updated sanctions regulations (with new entities and individuals targeted) and best practice guides for exporters. The EU is expected to adopt an 11th sanctions package in the coming weeks, adding new products to the ban on transit through Russia, a tool to combat circumvention of sanctions and a ban on exports to Russian &#8220;phantom&#8221; entities and third countries that re-export to Russia<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The aim is to reduce exports via intermediaries, by sanctioning entities and third countries strongly suspected of supplying and contributing to the development of the Russian military-industrial complex.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Recommendations for exporting companies</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>It is recommended that companies put in place due diligence measures (i.e. vigilance procedures) to assess the risks of non-compliance before any export. The verification, more commonly known as &#8220;screening&#8221;, of recipient companies and end-users must now be systematic. <u>It is imperative to ensure that the recipient company does not reship the goods to a Russian end-user under sanction</u>. In addition, it is advisable for exporters to include a non-re-export clause (NRC) or an end-use certificate (EUC) in their sales contracts to ensure that the goods are not re-exported to a sanctioned Russian end-user.</p>
<p>In addition, exporters are advised to include a non-re-export clause (NRC) or an end-use certificate (EUC) in their sales contracts in order to commit their customers not to re-export the goods to sanctioned persons, and to justify their good faith to their authorities or even to their commercial partners and thereby protect themselves from possible fines<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a>.</p>
<p>The American<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a>, British<a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> and European<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> administrations have listed &#8220;red flags&#8221; to alert companies. They concern all parties involved in the transaction (including the customer, the end-user, sometimes even carriers or intermediaries), the product being exported, and the country or countries involved in the export.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>In particular, the following indicators can be considered as warning signals to be taken into account before exporting:</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>The reluctance of the customer to provide accurate information on use and end-user,</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Disproportionate delivery costs,</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>The use of complex arrangements to conceal the recipient (shell companies, multiple intermediaries),</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Inaccurate description of the product in the commercial and financial documentation</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Abnormal shipping routes via countries with active trade relations with Russia,</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
<li>Countries of destination with weak export control legislation.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Should you have any questions about sanctions or sanctions circumvention and due diligence measures feel free to contact the lawyers at CUSTAX &amp; LEGAL.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Paris, 24 May 2023.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<hr />
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a><em> Official G7 Leaders&#8217; Communiqué on Ukraine, 19 May 2023 (</em><a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/64494/g7-2023-statement-on-ukraine.pdf"><em>Online</em></a><em>)</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a><em> U.S. Department of State press release, 19 May 2023 (</em><a href="https://www.state.gov/united-states-imposes-additional-sanctions-and-export-controls-on-russia-in-coordination-with-international-partners/"><em>Online</em></a><em>)</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a><em> UK Foreign, Commonwealth &amp; Development Office press release, 19 May 2023 (</em><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-sanctions-target-russias-theft-of-ukrainian-grain-advanced-military-technology-and-remaining-revenue-sources"><em>Online</em></a><em>)</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a><em> Press release by the President of the European Commission Ursula Von Der Leyen, 9 May 2023 (</em><a href="https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/statement_23_2661"><em>Online</em></a><em>)</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a><em> Notice to economic operators, importers and exporters (2022/C 145 I/01) (</em><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52022XC0401(04)"><em>Online</em></a><em>)</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a><em> Red Flags indicators, BIS (</em><a href="https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=51&amp;catid=18"><em>Online</em></a><em>)</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a><em> Notice of UK Department for Business &amp; Trade, 22 May 2023 (</em><a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/notice-to-exporters-202308-russia-sanctions-trade-sanctions-circumvention/nte-202308-russia-sanctions-trade-sanctions-circumvention"><em>Online</em></a><em>)</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> <em>Annex 2 to European Commission Recommendation (EU) 2019/1318 on internal compliance programmes for the control of trade in dual-use items, 30 July 2019 (</em><a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32019H1318&amp;from=EN"><em>Online</em></a><em>)</em></p>
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		<title>Correlation table codes CN / dual use goods updated</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/table-de-correlation-codes-nc-biens-a-double-usage/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[lucie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Jan 2023 15:57:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Customs Engineering & Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/table-de-correlation-codes-nc-biens-a-double-usage/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The EU correlation table between customs codes (Combined Nomenclature) and &#8220;dual-use goods&#8221; codes has been updated as of 17 January 2023. This table is only indicative and does not exempt operators from carrying out a classification analysis of their products in accordance with the applicable regulations. It is available on the Europa CIRCABC website.]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://xrm.eudonet.com/XRM/ut?tok=EDB4B57B&amp;cs=CkWXwEKWPTP33czgWSUILW22WELqohnCtdH_wpRXKv8%3d&amp;p=A3J54cHtKBCtHHM_qwV35YeFnFd7gqMx3lneVN1zJQPBF--Ooa8BgtGz_-j0SaDaYU4QD2qQ8KW1DQ4FXZFPOia-F3yty9oQobAjnluCI_xAsHFq8rTlomYLRlpbigq4C4s_F4DrYHi1BLtTKsaolbvqwbTEv2c-XokCkQS4hMyzDnO23v3uVN4XAViaCOXvIINXAxGIHIRorG-W2fcoA9KeBY28xczC9G2DcDScy6gFl24a7pwtw_zy9JsuLHNDsVCa28jebMl0zb8f1NB-xDGLnSnBfVmGoYscY4uILXCILGbbRj3PqA%3d%3d">The EU correlation table</a> between customs codes (Combined Nomenclature) and &#8220;dual-use goods&#8221; codes has been updated as of 17 January 2023.</p>
<p>This table is only indicative and does not exempt operators from carrying out a classification analysis of their products in accordance with the applicable regulations.</p>
<p>It is available on the Europa <a href="https://circabc.europa.eu/ui/group/0e5f18c2-4b2f-42e9-aed4-dfe50ae1263b/library/5dd41063-a86d-4f8f-9014-50727849fe63/details">CIRCABC website.</a></p>
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		<title>War in Ukraine: Do international sanctions still qualify as force majeure?</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/guerre-en-ukraine-les-sanctions-internationales-constituent-elles-toujours-un-cas-de-force-majeure/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[lucie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jan 2023 13:26:54 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Customs Engineering & Law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environmental law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indirect taxation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/?p=895</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The sanctions regimes adopted by the European Union and its allies following the invasion of Ukraine on 22 February 2022 have significantly affected trade in goods, technology and services with Russia by banning the majority of exports and supplies of services. As a result, many exporters or service providers found themselves unable to perform their [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The sanctions regimes adopted by the European Union and its allies following the invasion of Ukraine on 22 February 2022 have significantly affected trade in goods, technology and services with Russia by banning the majority of exports and supplies of services. As a result, many exporters or service providers found themselves unable to perform their contracts. Nevertheless, amending Regulations to Council Regulation (EU) <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0833">No 833/2014</a> of 31 July 2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia&#8217;s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine, have provided for time extensions for the execution of certain contracts concluded before the various dates of entry into force of the sanctions, or ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts provided that an authorisation be requested from the competent authorities before a date set by the Regulations. However, these derogations are limited to a few types of contracts for well-defined periods. Therefore, when these provisions cannot be used, some contractors have been able to seek relief from performance under “force majeure”. Whether or not force majeure can be claimed depends on the nature of the contract. Indeed, some contracts include force majeure clauses, in which case it is necessary to refer to the letter of said clauses to know under which conditions it is possible to use them. If the contract does not provide for such clauses, it is advisable to consider the possibility of claiming force majeure in the chosen jurisdiction in the event of a dispute concerning the performance of the contract. It should be noted that it is common for contracts with Russia to contain international arbitration clauses, in which case the arbitral tribunal may apply different laws depending on the contractual provisions and the will of the parties. Anyway, the restrictive measures adopted in response to the invasion of Ukraine may constitute force majeure in many jurisdictions.</p>
<p>However, after a certain period of time following the entry into force of the various packages of sanctions, can force majeure still be claimed for ongoing contracts?</p>
<p>We shall focus on force majeure claims in the context of international sanctions under French law (I), before looking at force majeure in the context of international arbitration (II) and analysing the issues relating to the temporality of force majeure claims (III).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1>I-              Claiming force majeure in the context of sanctions against Russia under French law</h1>
<p>Under French law, force majeure is governed by <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000032041431/">Article 1218 of the Civil Code</a>, which states that &#8221; force majeure<em> is constituted in contractual matters when an event beyond the debtor&#8217;s control, which was not reasonably foreseeable at the time of the conclusion of the contract and whose effects cannot be avoided by appropriate measures, prevents the debtor from performing his obligation</em>&#8220;. Thus, if the conditions of unforeseeability, exteriority and irresistibility are met, force majeure can be claimed, so that when the impediment is temporary, contractual performance is suspended and when the impediment is definitive, the contract is terminated by law. However, as the French Court of Cassation very recently recalled, <em>&#8216;whereas, in any event, only an event of an unforeseeable, irresistible and external nature constitutes force majeure; [&#8230;] these characteristics are assessed</em> in concreto&#8217;<a href="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1">[1]</a>.</p>
<p>Regarding the French co-contractor, at the beginning of the invasion, he found himself facing an unpredictable situation, since no one had foreseen the extent of the international sanctions adopted following the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. He is also confronted with a situation of externality and irresistibility, since the situation exceeds his control, and he is unable to take measures to avoid the effects of the sanctions.</p>
<p>By contrast, the French Court of Cassation, faced with a force majeure claim by an Iranian bank targeted by UN sanctions, ruled in a decision of 10 July, 2020, that &#8220;freezing the assets of a person or entity affected by this measure because of its activities does not constitute a case of force majeure for the person who is subject to it, for lack of exteriority&#8221;<a href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2">[2]</a>. Consequently, the Russian co-contractor who is nominally targeted by restrictive measures will not be able to claim force majeure, since he will not meet the condition of exteriority.</p>
<h1></h1>
<h1>II-             Claiming force majeure in the context of international sanctions before international arbitration courts</h1>
<p>Concerning sales between companies, Article 79 of the <a href="https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/media-documents/uncitral/en/19-09951_e_ebook.pdf">United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods</a> signed in Vienna in 1980, to which both France and Russia are parties, states that “<em>a </em><em>party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proves that the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the contract or to have avoided or overcome it, or its consequences</em>”.</p>
<p>In particular, this definition has been reproduced in similar terms in Article 7.1.7 of the <a href="https://www.unidroit.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Unidroit-Principles-2016-English-bl.pdf">UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts</a>. As explained in the Preamble of the Principles, although the Principles are not binding <em>per se</em>, “<em>t</em><em>hey shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by them. They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be governed by general principles of law, the </em>lex mercatoria<em> or the like</em>”.</p>
<p>Thus, the criteria of force majeure under French law are mirrored at the international level, so that once again, the adoption of sanctions against Russia may, depending on the particular situation, constitute force majeure.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h1>III-           Validity of the unforeseeability factor several months after the invasion</h1>
<p>However, the question of unforeseeability arises in relation to contracts concluded after the invasion of Ukraine concerning areas which were not subject to sanctions at the time of conclusion, but which later became so.</p>
<p>Indeed, several arbitral awards of the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) have held that, as the relevant export controls came into force before the conclusion of the contract, the factor of unforeseeability was lacking for the situation to qualify as force majeure<a href="#_ftn3" name="_ftnref3">[3]</a>.</p>
<p>Consequently, it is then necessary to determine at which point one can consider that one is faced with an unforeseeable situation. In the medical field, for example, it was considered that the dengue epidemic was recurrent and therefore predictable<a href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4">[4]</a> or that the arrival of the H1N1 virus had been widely predicted even before the implementation of health regulations<a href="#_ftn5" name="_ftnref5">[5]</a>. Regarding the Coronavirus pandemic, it was recognised that it was not a force majeure situation <em>per se</em> but that certain situations arising from it could be considered as force majeure due to their unforeseeability, exteriority and irresistibility<a href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6">[6]</a>. This can partly be explained by the unprecedented scale of restrictions adopted in response to the pandemic.</p>
<p>Therefore, in the context of the war in Ukraine, in the current absence of case law on the matter, it is important to note that such drastic restrictive measures have never been adopted in a similar context. Therefore, in addition to the war itself, the <em>fait du Prince</em><a href="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7">[7]</a> resulting from it can be deemed force majeure, even several months after the entry into force of the first sanctions measures taken following the invasion of Ukraine. Thus, it is possible to consider that even for contracts signed after the invasion of Ukraine relating to areas that a person acting in good faith could not have imagined would be affected by new sanctions, force majeure could be characterised.</p>
<h1></h1>
<h1>Conclusion</h1>
<p><strong>  In conclusion, it is essential to recall that the force majeure claim to justify the non-performance of the provisions of a contract requires the presence of factors of exteriority, irresistibility and unforeseeability, which are analysed on a case-by-case basis. In the context of the war in Ukraine, the sanctions adopted against Russia were of such unprecedented magnitude that it would be possible to consider that the different waves of sanctions were all unforeseeable.</strong></p>
<p><strong>            Regardless, it must be stressed that Regulation (EU) 833/2014 establishes an &#8220;anti-claims shield&#8221;<a href="#_ftn8" name="_ftnref8">[8]</a> in the event of litigation or arbitration, which as highlighted in the decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal of 15 February 2000 in the case of <em>La Compagnie Nationale Air France v. Libyan Arab Airlines</em>, does not render the dispute non-arbitrable<a href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9">[9]</a>. Accordingly, Article 11(1) of Regulation (EU) 833/2014 specifies that “<em>no claims in connection with any contract or transaction the performance of which has been affected, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by the measures imposed under this Regulation […] shall be satisfied</em>”.</strong></p>
<p><strong><em>            </em>Substantially, companies that continue to do business with Russia are advised to assess the compliance of their current contracts with the various sanctions and to ensure that clauses relating to the impact of international sanctions are included when concluding new contracts.</strong></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>_________________________________________________</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref1" name="_ftn1">[1]</a> Cour de cassation, Chambre civile 3, 7 décembre 2022, n°21-12.604.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref2" name="_ftn2">[2]</a> Cour de cassation, Ass. Plén., 10 juillet 2020 n° 18-18.542 et 18-21.814.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref3" name="_ftn3">[3]</a> <em>Recueil des sentences arbitrales de la CCI 2016-2020, </em>Affaires 2216, 3093/3100 et 3740, <em>Kluwer Law International</em>, 15 janvier 2022.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref4" name="_ftn4">[4]</a> Cour d&#8217;appel de Nancy, 1ère chambre, 22 novembre 2010, n° 09/00003.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref5" name="_ftn5">[5]</a> Cour d’appel de Besançon,  8 janv. 2014, n° 12/02291.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref6" name="_ftn6">[6]</a> Cour d’appel de Colmar, 6ème chamabre, 16 mars 2020, n° 20/01142 ; n° 20/01143 et n° 20/01206.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref7" name="_ftn7">[7]</a> French legal concept used in French administrative law to designate a measure taken by the administration which has an impact on a contract to which it is party or more broadly, an arbitrary act by a government, head of state or other public authority.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref8" name="_ftn8">[8]</a> Pierrick Le Goff, Thierry Titone, Matthieu Dary, Natalia Ivanytska et Thibaut Brenot, « Sanctions contre la Russie : enjeux juridiques et impacts contractuels », <em>Degaullefleurance</em> [en ligne], 18 mars 2022.</p>
<p><a href="#_ftnref9" name="_ftn9">[9]</a> Decision of the Québec Court of Appeal [2000] R.J.Q. 717, J.Q. No. 410.</p>
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		<title>French Decree 2022/901: the consequences for the defence industry and civil aviation</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/decret-2022-901-les-consequences-pour-les-industriels-de-la-defense-et-laviation-civile/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[lucie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 2022 15:40:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Environmental law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/decret-2022-901-les-consequences-pour-les-industriels-de-la-defense-et-laviation-civile/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[On 19 June 2022, Decree 2022/901 on war material, arms and ammunition and sensitive operations relating to national defence or national security came into force. &#160; It is mainly aimed at the arms industry but also at civil aviation stakeholders. &#160; It brings, in particular, the following new features: Modify classification A2, relating to war [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On 19 June 2022, <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000045930472">Decree 2022/901</a> on war material, arms and ammunition and sensitive operations relating to national defence or national security came into force.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>It is mainly aimed at the arms industry but also at civil aviation stakeholders.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>It brings, in particular, the following new features:</p>
<ol>
<li>Modify classification A2, relating to war materials (drones, electromagnetic or laser beam weapons&#8230;).</li>
<li>Controlling the manufacture and trade of new war materials, weapons and ammunition, as well as their import and export.</li>
<li>Incorporate exemptions from aeronautical easements affecting civil aviation.</li>
</ol>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>1/ Firstly, Decree 2022/901 modifies the A2 Classification (<a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000045938551/2022-07-04">R311-2 of the Internal Security Code</a>).</p>
<p style="padding-left: 80px;">
<p style="padding-left: 80px;">*NB: Category A is divided into two sub-categories:</p>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>A1: firearms (handguns or long guns, their ammunition and components) prohibited from possession and;</li>
<li>A2 (&#8220;War Material&#8221;): in particular, automatic repeating weapons as well as materials intended to carry or use these weapons in combat (combat equipment, laser beam weapons, etc.).</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p style="padding-left: 80px;">Regarding the &#8220;war material&#8221;, classified as A2, the following are required:</p>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>A specific authorisation from the French Minister of Defense (Bureau of Regulation, Classification, Dual Use and Industrial Security or &#8220;BRSI&#8221;) for manufacturing, trading, intermediation activities, called &#8220;AFCI&#8221; (<a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000006539944/2004-12-21">L2332-1 of the Defence Code</a>).</li>
<li>An import (AIMG) and export or intra-EU transfer authorisation (respectively Articles <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000038666170/">L2335-1</a> and <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000029227371/">L2335-2</a> or <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000024230140/">L2335-9 of the Defence Code),</a> in order to be able to negotiate, accept orders and ship these materials outside France</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">First of all, the Decree modifies the third paragraph of item A2, previously limited to directed energy weapons (DEW) using a laser beam, to include high-powered electromagnetic wave weapons.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">However, there is no indication of the value of the power in question.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 80px;">*NB: Electromagnetic weapons use high-powered microwave beams of various frequencies, from a few kHz to several hundred GHz.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">Then, the Decree adds a new sub-category A2§19° (bold added): &#8220;<em>Weapons, designed to <strong>destroy </strong>or <strong>render inoperative </strong>aircraft travelling without a person on board, designed for <strong>military use </strong>or <strong>national security</strong></em>&#8220;.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 80px;">*NB: This new category specifically targets weapons designed for the neutralisation of drones. According to <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000041834375/">Article R311-1 of the Code of Homeland Security,</a> a weapon is defined as &#8220;<em>any object or device designed or intended by nature to kill, injure, strike, <strong>neutralise </strong>or <strong>cause incapacitation</strong></em>&#8220;.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">These new laser or electromagnetic devices aimed at neutralising drones therefore meet this definition of a &#8220;weapon&#8221;.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">It therefore appears that any anti-drone device <u>designed for military </u>or <u>national security use is </u>now classified as A2 war material.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">Thus, companies that design, manufacture or trade such systems must verify whether their products now fall under the new category A2§19°. If so, an AFCI must be requested from the DGA/BRSI, since it is necessary to continue any manufacturing or commercial activity related to the A2 category.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">At last but not least, to allow for this transition, the Decree provides that operators holding equipment newly classified as A2§3° or A2§19° must:</p>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>either divest itself of the equipment in question in accordance with the terms of <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000029655111/">Article R312-19 of the Internal Security Code, </a></li>
<li>or request the authorisations required to retain this equipment, in accordance with the terms of <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000037908079/">Article R2332-5 of the Defence Code</a> or <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000037908267/">R312-27 of the Internal Security Code</a>, within 12 months of 18 June 2022 (date of publication of this text).</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>2/ Secondly, Decree 2022/901 modifies <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000037908079/">Article R2332-5 of the Defence Code</a>, relating to the authorisation of manufacture, trade and intermediation.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">In the second paragraph, the word &#8220;national territory&#8221; is deleted: &#8220;<em>The use or exploitation, on <span style="text-decoration: line-through;">national territory</span>, of war material and similar material for the benefit of either public persons or private persons who can prove an interest linked to the exercise of their professional activities or their corporate purpose</em>.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">In practice this was already the case, but the legislator wanted to remove all ambiguity and recall here, that even for the use or exploitation of war material or similar material<u> outside the national territory</u>, an AFCI is required.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">Please note that this change will only come into force from 1<sup>er</sup> October 2022.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>3/ Finally, the Decree 2022/901, has integrated derogations concerning the areas subject to aeronautical easements, in Articles <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000026875170">D242-8</a> and <a href="https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/codes/article_lc/LEGIARTI000045938808/2022-07-04">D242-9 of the Civil Aviation Code</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">*NB: An <em>aeronautical clearance zone </em>is an area in which the height of buildings and obstacles of any kind is regulated. The purpose of this zone is to protect aircraft so that they can operate safely in the air and in particular during the approach phase (runway turn).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The modification of these two articles has the following effect: the Minister of the Armed Forces may request, after a technical study, the installation of equipment contributing to aeronautical safety or to the safety of public air transport as well as the construction of buildings or installations necessary for the conduct of works, on the aerodromes of which he is the main or sole assignee (within the meaning of Article R211-6 of the Civil Aviation Code).</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The Minister of Defence can therefore replace the territorially competent State representative, who was previously the only one who could authorise these installations.</p>
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		<title>6th Package of Sanctions Against Russia: Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879</title>
		<link>https://www.custax.com/en/6eme-paquet-de-sanctions-contre-la-russie-le-reglement-ue-2022-879-du-conseil/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[lucie]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 06 Jun 2022 16:22:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Export control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[News]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.custax.com/6eme-paquet-de-sanctions-contre-la-russie-le-reglement-ue-2022-879-du-conseil/</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The 6th package of sanctions imposed by the European Union on Russia for its actions in Ukraine entered into force on the 4th of June. It contains, in particular, Regulation (EU) 2022/879 amending Regulation (EU) 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia&#8217;s actions in Ukraine. It complements previous sanctions that have progressively been put [&#8230;]]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The 6th package of sanctions imposed by the European Union on Russia for its actions in Ukraine entered into force on the 4<sup>th</sup> of June. It contains, in particular, <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.153.01.0053.01.ENG&amp;toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A153%3ATOC">Regulation (EU) 2022/879</a> amending <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32014R0833">Regulation (EU) 833/2014</a> concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia&#8217;s actions in Ukraine. It complements previous sanctions that have progressively been put in place by the EU since 2014 in response to Russia&#8217;s behaviour. They encompass different types of sanctions, including:</p>
<ul>
<li>Freezing the assets of key Russian leaders;</li>
<li>Restricting Russia&#8217;s access to European capital markets;</li>
<li>Excluding some banks from the Swift system and freezing the assets of the Central Bank of Russia;</li>
<li>Prohibiting Russian Media Russia Today and Sputnik from broadcasting in the EU;</li>
<li>Closing EU airspace, ports, and roads to Russian transport operators;</li>
<li>Prohibition on imports (coal, iron, steel, wood, cement, seafood, and liquor) and exports (arms, dual-use goods, goods and technology in the aviation, maritime and space industry, and luxury goods).</li>
</ul>
<p>A further detailed list with links to relevant legislation is available on the <a href="https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-against-russia-over-ukraine/">European Council and Council of the European Union website</a>.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Council Regulation (EU) 2022/879 of 3 June 2022, mainly introduces the following provisions:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">&#8211; Concerning <strong>oil</strong>, a ban on the purchase, import or transfer of crude oil (to come into force in December 2022) and certain <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R0879&amp;from=FR#d1e34-74-1">refined petroleum products</a> (to come into force in February 2023) from Russia to the EU. However, temporary exemptions, which do not concern France, are granted to Member States which, due to their circumstances, would be disproportionately affected by such restrictions.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">&#8211; As for <strong>financial sanctions</strong>, the prohibition to provide specialised financial messaging services (SWIFT) is extended to three other <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R0879&amp;from=FR#d1e34-70-1">Russian credit institutions</a> (Sberbank, Credit Bank of Moscow and Russian Agricultural Bank) and to the Belarusian Bank for Development and Reconstruction.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">&#8211; Russian channels Rossiya RTR/RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24/Russia 24 and TV Centre International have been added to the list of media affected by the EU <strong>broadcasting ban</strong>.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">&#8211; <strong>Import and export restrictions</strong> are extended, including:</p>
<ul>
<li style="list-style-type: none;">
<ul>
<li>The <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R0879&amp;from=FR#d1e32-62-1">list of persons and entities</a> affected by export restrictions on dual-use goods and technology has been extended;</li>
<li>The same applies to the <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R0879&amp;from=FR#d1e32-65-1">list of goods and technologies that could strengthen Russian defence and security sectors</a>;</li>
<li>The <a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32022R0879&amp;from=FR#d1e34-72-1">list of goods and technologies prohibited for purchase, import, transfer, and brokering</a> has been updated as well.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">&#8211; Regarding <strong>services</strong>, it is prohibited to provide, directly or indirectly, technical assistance, brokering services, financing or financial assistance or any service linked to the exploitation of natural resources, as well as accounting, auditing, including statutory audit, bookkeeping or tax consulting services, or business and management consulting or public relations services to the Russian government or to legal persons, entities or bodies established in Russia (there are some exceptions to that). It is also prohibited to register, provide a registered office, business or administrative address as well as management services to, a trust or any similar legal arrangement having as a trustor or a beneficiary Russian nationals or natural persons resident in Russia or Russian legal persons, entities or bodies.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>To find out more about the impact of these new measures on your business, please contact us at &#x63;&#x6f;&#x6e;&#x74;&#x61;&#x63;&#x74;&#x40;&#x63;&#x75;&#x73;&#x74;&#x61;&#x78;&#x2e;&#x63;&#x6f;&#x6d;.</p>
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